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1. Introduction 
The impact of higher oil prices on the Russian economy has some features that are similar to the 
effects in any oil consuming country. End user prices on energy increase, leading to substitution and 
income effects for non-oil producers and consumers. In general the macroeconomic impact is lower 
GDP and higher inflation. The magnitude of these effects depends on the policy response of the 
authorities including monetary and fiscal policy measures. However, in an oil and gas producing 
country such as Russia there will be additional positive income effects due to higher national income 
through positive terms of trade effects. One could also expect a direct effect of the oil price on 
investments in the domestic petroleum sector, with second round effects through demand for input 
directed towards other parts of the economy.  
 
In earlier, model based analyses of the Russian economy, computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models have often been applied. There is a number of studies that use CGE models of the Russian 
economy to assess impacts of trade policy options such as EU enlargement, Russia's WTO accession 
and the creation of the Common European Economic Space on Russian economy; see e.g. Jensen et al. 
(2004), Rutherford et al. (2005), Alekseev et al. (2003), Sulamaa and Widgren (2004). BOFIT (Bank 
of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition) used a multiregional general equilibrium model 
GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project modelling framework) to study impacts of Russian energy 
policy instruments on the Russian economy (Kerkelä 2004). The Central Bank of the Russian 
Federation (CBR) has a model framework closely related to the BOFIT models. 
 
CGE models are handy when modelling economies for which time series data are scarce, and are thus 
often applied on developing economies. In such models, strong, theoretical assumptions replace 
historical evidence. 
 
Empirical modelling constitutes a reality check on theory based assumptions. Data for macroeconomic 
variables are now available for a sufficient time period and of satisfactory quality to make possible the 
development of an empirical model of the Russian economy with desirable theoretical as well as 
statistical properties. In our view there remains a need for empirically based modelling of the Russian 
economy, of which we have found only a few attempts in the literature. BOFIT has developed a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model for the Russian economy (see Rautava, 2004), which is used for 
forecasting. Suni (2007) utilises the global NiGEM model developed by the National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research which includes a simple representation of the Russian economy, to 
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assess the oil price dependency of the Russian economy.  Merlevede et al. (2009) estimate a somewhat 
more detailed macro econometric model of the Russian economy with the same purpose. Both papers 
find evidence for significant oil price dependency. 
 
We develop a macro econometric model of the Russian economy, containing 13 estimated equations – 
covering major national account variables, prices, the exchange rate, the money market interest rate 
and the labour market – and a number of identities. The model includes important channels through 
which petroleum income affects the Russian economy. Direct effects are identified through oil 
exports, domestic inflation and government expenditure end revenue, and there are several indirect 
channels. Due to lack of sufficient data for petroleum investments, we have not been able to test the 
presence of a direct link from oil prices to petroleum investments explicitly in our model. Indirect 
effects of the oil price on petroleum investments are implicitly covered in the aggregate investment 
function. Furthermore, the model incorporates reaction functions for Russian fiscal and monetary 
policy. This provides us with the option of leaving economic policy endogenous, based on the 
estimated behaviour of fiscal and monetary authorities. 
 
In the model, increasing oil prices lead to higher growth in government revenues than in government 
expenditure, introducing a stabilizing element to the economy, as well as means to be channelled into 
the Government controlled Reserve Fund and National Welfare Fund. In line with the Dutch disease 
hypothesis1, an increase in the oil price yields a real appreciation of the rouble in the model, leading to 
reduced non-oil exports. 
 
Although the CBR’s main tool conducting monetary policy has been to provide the economy with 
sufficient liquidity with concern to inflation and the exchange rate, we find evidence for a “lean 
against the wind” interest rate equation, where interest rates increase in the face of higher inflation and 
lower unemployment. We find no direct effects of the interest rate on household consumption or 
private investments. However, the interest rate affects non-oil exports through the exchange rate in the 
model, reinforcing the Dutch disease effect: Increasing inflation is met by higher interest rates, leading 
to a stronger rouble. Thus, rising interest rates deal non-oil export industries a double blow, through 
increasing inflation and a stronger rouble. 
                                                     
1 The Dutch disease hypothesis states that an increase in revenues from natural resources will lead to deindustrialisation by 
raising the exchange rate, and thus making the manufacturing sector less competitive. The term was introduced by The 
Economist in 1977 to illustrate the decline of the Dutch manufacturing sector following the discovery of large natural gas 
resources in the Netherlands in 1959. See for instance Wijnbergen (1984). 
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The estimation period runs from 1995Q1 to 2008Q1. The estimated equations are interpretable in 
accordance with economic theory, and satisfy standard statistical tests of residual properties and 
parameter stability. The model facilitates analyses of effects of changes in a number of central macro 
variables, such as economic policy variables, the exchange rate, international demand and prices – 
including the oil price. Model simulations suggest an important role for the oil price in the Russian 
economy and imply vulnerability to negative shocks in the oil price. However, we also find indications 
that the Russian economy exhibits significant growth capabilities in the absence of growth in the oil 
price. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows: There is a brief description of vital aspects of the oil market and 
its importance to the Russian economy in section 0. In section 0 there is a general introduction to the 
model, followed by a discussion of the econometric equations and central identities in section 0. 
Section 0 also presents data sources, explains estimation procedures and presents results of the 
empirical investigations. In section 0 there is an evaluation of overall model performance, while 
section 2 documents model simulations with two counterfactual scenarios for the oil price. Section 3 
contains a discussion of possible extensions and modifications of the model, and concludes on the 
major findings of the analysis. 
2. The Russian oil economy  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia engaged in an ambitious shock therapy 
privatization program under IMF guidance. Broken down supply chains, withdrawal of government 
demand and uncompetitive production led to widespread industrial insolvency and a collapse in 
government tax revenue. This, coupled with low oil prices and an IMF devised plan of pegging the 
rouble to counter inflation, led the government to accumulate large foreign loans in an attempt to 
offset capital outflows and cover the increasing budget deficit. The setup could not last and in 1998 the 
government defaulted on its foreign payments, floated the rouble and introduced capital restrictions. 
Departure from the artificially strong rouble gave Russian enterprises a chance to recover and in 1999 
positive growth rates returned. For nine consecutive years, Russia stayed on a steady growth path, see 
Figure 2.2, until the global recession in 2009. 
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Figure 2.1: Brent Nominal USD/bbl. 1976-20092 
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The importance of oil exports to Russia’s economic development is a matter of much discussion. The 
breakup of the Soviet Union was preceded by an abrupt fall in nominal crude prices in early 1986, 
from an average of USD 33 in the first half of the 1980s to hovering around USD 16 USD in the 
second half. Gaidar (2007), among others, claims that the drop in oil revenues was the prime trigger of 
the Soviet collapse. In more recent times, the economic boom of Putin’s presidency with average 
annual GDP growth in excess of 7 per cent, has been accompanied by a substantial increase in oil 
prices. While the 2009 slump was preceded by a USD 100 drop in the oil price from July 2008 to 
January 2009, one should be careful to expect similar effects of oil price volatility today as those 
experienced by the Soviet Union. For the Soviet economy hard currency oil income was the main 
remedy against systemic flaws that were making the socialist economy increasingly infeasible. 
                                                     
2 The correct reference price for Russian exports would be the price of the Urals grade. However, since Urals time series are 
not readily available for the desired time period and at desired frequency we have chosen Brent as an acceptable proxy. Due 
to higher sulfur levels Urals is generally traded a couple of USD below Brent. 
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Figure 2.2: Russian Real GDP Growth and Inflation 1993-2009 
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Russia ranks as the world’s second largest oil producer, occasionally creeping up on Saudi Arabia in 
export volumes. The country’s production reached a temporary post-communism peak in 2007, 
totalling almost 10 million bbl/day. It has been argued that mature Russian provinces are past their 
‘peak oil’ production and that production from now on will steadily decline, or at best be maintained if 
new provinces are developed, cf. Jackson and Razak (2008). 
 
In September 2009, however, Russia reached a new record level of oil production averaging 10 
million bbl/day, surpassing Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil producer.3 In early 2009, Russian 
exports surpassed Saudi Arabia’s 7 million bbl/day, reaching 7.4. 
 
Russia’s production decreased during the price hike of 2008 but reached new record levels under 
relatively modest prices in 2009. Rather than coordinating cuts with OPEC, Russia has eaten into 
OPEC market shares following OPEC cutbacks. Unless the OPEC capacity contracts sharply or 
OPEC–Russian relations develop significantly, Russia is best viewed as a price taker in today’s oil 
markets. 
                                                     
3 http://www.oilexp.ru/news/russian_rinok/rossiya-postavila-novyj-rekord-dobychi-nefti/29723/ 
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Figure 2.3 Russian and Saudi Historic Oil Production 
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Russia exports a significant amount of natural gas as well as petrochemical products in addition to 
crude oil. The slight increase in petrochemicals’ contribution to hydrocarbon export value seen in 
Figure 2.4 is a response to Russian policy of increased domestic processing. Gas has reduced its share 
compared to crude. This can be explained by the fact that gas production (and hence exports) remained 
relatively stable throughout the 90s and therefore has not seen the same rebound as crude production. 
With crude production at a perceived peak, one might expect the importance of gas to increase in the 
years to come. The impact from gas and petrochemical exports on the Russian economy is likely to be 
analogous to that of oil prices as gas and petrochemical prices remain indexed to oil prices.  
 
Although global interest is mostly directed towards Russia’s role as an energy exporter, Russia is also 
a significant consumer. Whereas Russia’s gas market is characterized by low, regulated domestic 
prices, price formation in the oil market was liberalized in the 90s. Domestic oil prices therefore 
reflect changes in world prices despite distortions arising from regional monopolistic market 
structures.4 Rising oil prices can therefore be expected to entail the usual negative effects on domestic 
consumption, non-oil output and more, as described in the introduction. Gas has been exempted from 
                                                     
4 http://www.fas.gov.ru/competition/goods/analisys/a_226.shtml  
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international price volatility, but Russian policy makers are moving for a closer link between domestic 
and international prices. 
 
Figure 2.4: Russia’s Hydrocarbon Exports (Product Shares of Total By Value) 
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The importance of oil exports and hydrocarbon exports in general to the Russian economy arises along 
several channels. Income from crude has accounted for a significant share of Russian export revenues 
increasing from 25 per cent in 2000 to more than 35 per cent in 2008. Total hydrocarbon exports 
(inclusive natural gas and petrochemicals) accounted for 65 per cent of total export revenues in 2008. 
Fjærtoft (2008) found evidence that the price of crude is a key driving force behind Russia’s trade 
flow driven exchange rate. This finding is supported in the present paper. Hydrocarbon exports 
generated 50 per cent of federal budget revenues in 2008 (EEG 2009) and the governments scope of 
manoeuvre is directly linked to the price of crude. On a larger scale the oil and gas sector is estimated 
to account for 20–25 per cent of GDP (Anker and Sonnerby 2008). The oil and gas sector also 
accounts for an important share of investment demand (World Bank 2008). 
 
As an economy dominated by resource extraction and export, Russia faces the dangers of Dutch 
Disease, namely that an increase in revenues from natural resources will lead to deindustrialisation 
through an appreciating exchange rate. Westin (2004) found indications of Dutch disease in the 
Russian economy, later supported by Kalcheva and Oomes (2007). Similar results have also been 
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found for other raw material exporting countries like Australia, Canada and New Zealand (cf. Issa et 
al. 2006) and Norway (cf. Bjørnstad and Jansen (2007). Jahan-Parvar and Hassan (2008) report similar 
results for a number of countries. 
 
In recognition of the potentially detrimental long-run effects from instantly spending windfall profits 
and the benefits of saving for a rainy day (increasing future pension costs), the Russian government 
has repaid sovereign debt and, since 2004, accumulated reserves in the Stabilization fund, cf. Anker 
and Sonnerby (2008) for a review. The Stabilization Fund was transformed into a Reserve Fund and 
National Welfare Fund in 2008. Budget surpluses should be channelled into the second, once the first 
reaches 10 per cent of GDP. Apart from this, Russia does not practice a formalized rule for how much 
of oil and gas revenues that are to be spent.   
 
Gurvich (2004) provides a comprehensive macro assessment of the Russian economy’s oil price 
dependency. He argues that the influence of increased oil prices in the period 2000–2003 is lower than 
commonly claimed in the Russian discourse. Moreover, Gurvich (2004) estimates GDP growth with 
unchanged oil prices at 5 per cent compared to the actual 6.8 per cent annual average. However, it 
should be noted that the period of 2000–2003 displayed a modest level of oil prices compared to the 
subsequent years. The present paper also finds evidence that a substantial part of the Russian 
economic success during most of the 2000s is associated with the accompanying increase in the oil 
price. 
3. Main features of the model 
Our starting point is a relatively standard macroeconomic IS-LM framework, which includes 
macroeconomic relationships for the labour market, a fiscal block and a monetary policy rule captured 
in the interest rate equation. The model is presented in its entirety in Appendix A. 
 
The model’s IS-side consists of equations describing household consumption, private sector 
investment, public sector activity and net exports. The model includes an endogenous treatment of 
fiscal policy where government revenue and expenditure are directly affected by the oil price, inspired 
by the approach in Merlevede et al. (2009). This approach allows investigation of the effects of the 
Putin administration’s provision to channel some of the windfall profits into debt repayments and 
wealth accumulation (Robinson 2003). Oil exports and non-oil exports are modelled separately in 
order to identify oil price effects on oil exports, and to allow for testing of Dutch Disease effects on 
non-oil exports. 
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The LM-side of the model includes equations for the exchange rate and inflation. We assume a direct 
effect of oil prices on the exchange rate along the lines of Spatafora and Stavrev (2003) and likewise 
for producer and consumer prices. We assume that although Russia is the second largest oil exporter in 
the world, Russia’s market power is not sufficient to influence oil prices in the way OPEC attempts to 
do. Consequently, the oil price is treated as exogenous to the Russian economy. 
 
Monetary policy is modelled according to a Taylor rule where unemployment and inflation are 
assumed to be the target variables (Taylor 1993 and 2001). Unemployment is assumed to depend on 
economic activity and real wages, and wages to depend positively on consumer prices and 
productivity and negatively on unemployment. Domestic prices are assumed to depend on wages, 
international prices - including the oil price - and the exchange rate. 
 
Overall, the model is made up of 13 estimated equations and a number of identities. The model 
facilitates analyses of, among other things, effects on the economy of changes in interest rates, 
government expenditure, international demand and prices – including the oil price. 
 
Data access limits the potential for detailed modelling of the Russian economy. The model is simple 
compared to large scale macro econometric models like for instance National Institute of Economic 
and Social Research’s NiGEM model of the UK economy (Barrel et al 2001)5, Fair’s US model (Fair 
2004) and Statistics Norway’s model of the Norwegian economy, MODAG (Baug and Dyvi 2008), to 
mention a few. Simplicity makes the model more accessible and easier to understand and 
communicate. We argue that it contributes to a better understanding of core driving forces in the 
Russian economy. However, transparency and traceability comes at the expense of less details and 
realism. Weak spots and suggestions for expanding the model are discussed in the final section of the 
paper. 
4. Data and estimation 
4.1. Data 
The model is estimated on quarterly data.6 National accounts data are from IMF International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). Data for government expenditure and revenues are from the Russian 
                                                     
5 See also http://www.niesr.ac.uk/research/research.php#1  
6 The software EViews6 is used for all estimation and simulation procedures. 
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Ministry of Finance, Economic Expert Group. Other data are from Reuters EcoWin. See appendix A 
for details. The estimation period is limited by data availability at the beginning of the sample and by 
the global financial crisis at the end of the sample, and runs from 1995Q1 to 2008Q1. The model lacks 
a sophisticated description of financial markets and is not capable of explaining the effects of the 
global financial crisis of 2008. Attempts to include four additional quarters produced large residuals, 
as could be expected in the face of an exogenous shock to the economy of this magnitude, originated 
in a part of the economy barely described by the model. When the world economy in general and the 
Russian economy in particular, return to “business as usual”, the model may regain its relevance as a 
useful description of the Russian economy. This is a highly important topic for future research. 
Because of dynamics, simulation of the full model can start in 1996Q1. 
 
Russian macroeconomic data has recently become more available due to increased and improved 
reporting, and are now available for a sufficient time period making empirical modelling feasible. 
Over the period for which we have obtained data, the Russian economy has gone through a gradual 
transition towards a market economy, and there has been some major changes along the way. The 
floating of the rouble in 1999 is handled by estimating the exchange rate and interest rate equations 
from 1999Q1. Furthermore, a step dummy in the household consumption equation is reflecting a 
change in consumer behaviour at the beginning of the millennium. Otherwise, recursive estimation 
indicates parameter stability, see appendix D. A comprehensive overview including definitions and 
sources is found in appendix A. 
4.2. Modelling methodology 
The modelling strategy is the general to specific approach (cf. Davidson et al. 1978), using ordinary 
least squares to estimate equilibrium correction models. Restrictions based on economic theory are 
applied if not rejected by statistical testing. It is emphasized that the final estimated equations should 
pass standard statistical tests for serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and normality in the residuals. 
Parameter stability is tested through recursive estimation. Statistical outliers are removed by impulse 
dummies if explainable and/or if substantial improvements in residual properties are achieved.  
4.3. Estimation 
In this section we present the estimated equations in the model. Lower case letters indicate logs. The 
delta (Δ) symbol represents change from the previous quarter. Delta terms correspond to short-run 
effects. The terms in brackets represent the equilibrium correction term, which in this setting is 
equivalent to the cointegrating vector. The cointegrating vector measures the long term effects of 
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changes to the exogenous variables on the endogenous variable (see e.g. Engle and Granger 1987 and 
Hendry 1995). Standard errors are presented below the coefficient estimates. All included variables 
are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, except for a few borderline cases, see appendix E for 
details. In all estimated equations the coefficient relating to the equilibrium correction term is 
significant with a negative sign, indicating a cointegrating relationship between the variables in the 
long run. 
 
Standard diagnostic tests for normality, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation do not indicate serious 
signs of misspecification for any of the estimated equations, see Appendix C. This is further confirmed 
by recursive estimation, demonstrating reasonable constancy as reported in Appendix D. Impulse-, 
level- and seasonal dummy variables are omitted in this section for simplicity. Detailed estimation 
results are displayed in appendix E. Appendix F displays actual and fitted values of the dependent 
variable, including error bounds based on a simulation of the full model. 
4.3.1. Consumption 
Equation 1:  
{ } 1(0.027) (0.057) (0.05) 0,0060.121 0.214 0.346 0.028 01 1−Δ = − − − + Δ −t ttc c yd yd DSTEP Q  
 
Real household consumption (c) depends on real disposable income (yd). The estimated equilibrium 
correction coefficient of –0.21 implies ceteris paribus a half-life of adjustment towards a new 
equilibrium of 3.5 quarters following a permanent shock to real disposable income. Consumption is 
homogenous of degree one in real disposable income in the long run, implying that a 1 per cent 
increase in real disposable income eventually will lead to a 1 per cent increase in household spending, 
all else equal. The homogeneity restriction is tested and not rejected. The positive estimated short-run 
elasticity of disposable income is close to 1/3 of its long-run counterpart, speeding up adjustment to a 
new equilibrium after a permanent change in real disposable income. 
 
Data for household wealth was not available. Accumulated household wealth in Russia remains low 
compared to Western European countries, and Russians remain largely unable to properly smooth 
consumption in order to counter income shocks. Empirical research by Notten and Crombrugghe 
(2006) supports the notion that wealth does not have a significant influence on aggregate Russian 
consumption decisions.  
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The real interest rate was not found to be significant, and has therefore been left out. To some extent, 
this could be explained by the low level of Russian wealth accumulation, as the rouble interest rate is 
not perceived by Russians to be an opportunity cost of holding cash, implying that money to a large 
extent is spent or invested in foreign currency. 
 
There is a step dummy (DSTEP01Q1) in the household consumption equation taking the value of 1 
until 2000Q4 and 0 thereafter, reflecting a permanent change in consumer behaviour at the beginning 
of the millennium. Merlevede et al (2009) identifies a similar effect, and suggest increased confidence 
as an explanation, as economic and political risk were perceived to be reduced in the wake of Putin’s 
take over at the onset of 2000.  
4.3.2. Investment 
Equation 2: 
{ } 1(0.148) (0.074)1.204 0.378 −Δ = − − −t ti i y  
 
Investment (i) is homogenous of degree one in GDP in the long run, implying that over time 
investments in Russia tend to follow the overall economy. This restriction is tested and not rejected. 
We do not find support for a relationship between investments and real interest rates (RPY), which is a 
common result in international empirical investigations. In the case of Russia this can be attributable 
to the fact that bank financing accounts for just 10 per cent of corporate sector fixed investments, and 
that most investments are financed through internal sources, less dependent on interest rates.  
 
Ideally, we would prefer to model oil investments separately, as this is an important sector in the 
Russian economy. Unfortunately, we have not been able to find adequate data for petroleum 
investments, and leave this for later research. If a direct relationship between the oil price and 
petroleum investments actually exists, this implies, ceteris paribus, that the effect of a change in the oil 
price is understated within our model framework. Indirect effects of the oil price, through income and 
demand effects are captured in the aggregated investment function. 
4.3.3. Non-oil exports 
Equation 3: 
{ } 11(0.428) (0.081) (0.111)1.828 0.355 0.245 0.375 −−Δ = − − − + + Δt ttxexoil xexoil wimp rex xexoil  
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Exports excluding oil (xexoil) depend in the long run on international demand (wimp) and the real 
exchange rate (rex); increasing in international demand, international prices (pyusa) and with a weaker 
rouble (rubusd), while decreasing in domestic prices (py). These findings are in line with the standard 
export model proposed by Armington (1969). Price homogeneity is tested and not rejected. An 
increase in the oil price affects non-oil exports through a real exchange rate appreciation in the overall 
model, thereby curbing exports from this sector. However, this effect is restrained by subsidized 
domestic energy supply, which curtails inflationary impulses from increased oil prices on domestic 
inflation. 
4.3.4. Oil exports 
Equation 4: 
{ } 31(0.194) (0.033) (0.156)0.561 0.098 0.612( ) 0.323 −−Δ = − − − Δ − Δt ttxoil xoil poilrub py py  
 
Oil exports (xoil) depend positively on the oil price measured in roubles (poilrub) relative to domestic 
prices (py) in the long run. This result is consistent with: (1) that an increased oil price yields lower 
domestic demand leading to higher exports at a given level of production, and (2) that domestic 
production depends positively on the oil price, as higher oil prices make more sources for oil 
production economically viable. International demand is tested and rejected as an explanatory variable 
in the model. The estimated coefficient of the equilibrium correction term of – 0.1 implies relatively 
slow adjustment of oil exports in the event of a shock in the oil price. This reflects that the high 
volatility of the oil price and the magnitude of investments necessary to increase production foster 
conservative behaviour and correspondingly slow adjustment of production capacity in response to 
changing oil prices in the petroleum sector.  
4.3.5. Imports 
Equation 5: 
{ } 1(0.166) 0.0720.384 0.292 0.267( ) −Δ = − − − + + +t tz z c i g xexoil  
 
Imports (z) depend in the long run on domestic demand (c + i + g) and exports excluding oil, as non oil 
exports include a significant amount of imported input. Relative prices and the exchange rate was not 
found to be significant, indicating that growth in imports have mainly come as a result of increased 
economic growth. This is contrary to other studies; cf. Merlevede et al. (2009), who find support for 
the real exchange rate as an explanatory variable for imports.  
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4.3.6. Unemployment 
Equation 6: 
{ } 1(0.039) (0.05)0.199 0.243 0.115 0.037( ) −Δ = − + − −t tU U y w py  
 
The unemployment rate (U) depends negatively on GDP and positively on real wages (w-py) in the 
long run. Notice that the coefficient estimate of the unemployment rate is a semi-elasticity as U is 
defined as a rate variable with no logarithmic transformation. This implies that the estimated long-run 
coefficients are to be interpreted as the percentage point change in unemployment following a change 
of 1 per cent of GDP and real wage respectively. 
4.3.7. Wages 
Equation 7: 
{ } 11(0.155) (0.042) (0.053)0.679 0.267 4.26 0.79 0.28 −−Δ = − − + − + Δt ttw w pc U prod pc  
 
Nominal wages (w) depend positively on consumer prices and productivity and negatively on the 
unemployment rate in the long run. Nominal wages are homogenous of degree one in consumer prices 
in the long run, implying that a 1 per cent increase in consumer prices eventually will lead to a 1 per 
cent increase in nominal wages, all else equal. This restriction is tested and not rejected. Additionally, 
there is a positive impact effect on wages of a change in consumer prices. 
 
Wages increasing with lower unemployment is consistent with the implications of the wage curve. 
When unemployment is high, workers are more concerned with jobs than with wages, constraining 
wage claims. Also, a larger pool of employable workers allows employers to moderate their wage 
offers.  
 
As in the unemployment equation, U is defined as a rate variable with no logarithmic transformation. 
Correspondingly, the estimated long-run coefficient of the unemployment rate should be interpreted as 
the percentage change in nominal wages following a change of 1 percentage point in the 
unemployment rate.  
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4.3.8. The GDP deflator 
Equation 8: 
{ } 1(0.118) (0.042)
1(0.02) (0.06)
1.121 0.416 0.488 0.149( )
0.102 0.384
−
−
Δ = − − − − +
+ Δ + Δ
t t
t t
py py w pceu poilrub
poilrub py  
 
The GDP deflator (py) depends on wages, international prices (pceu), the rouble oil price and the 
exchange rate in the long run. International prices are proxied by the CPI for the euro area, as the euro 
area is the dominating trading partner. The effect of wages is relatively strong, indicating that an 
increase in domestic factor costs has a greater impact on inflation than an increase in international 
factor costs. The oil price effect lends weight to the argument that energy prices in Russia have a 
significant influence on product prices. Long-run homogeneity in wages, foreign prices and the oil 
price is not statistically significant and therefore not imposed by restriction. This is a common finding, 
and does not appear to pose any problems when simulating the model. The equation also includes a 
positive impact effect of a shock to the oil price and a positive autoregressive term (Δpy). 
4.3.9. Consumer prices 
Equation 9: 
{ } 11(0.195) (0.055) (0.036)1.112 0.313 0.387( ) 0.086 0.505 −−Δ = − − − + − + Δt ttpc pc w pceu poilrub pc  
 
Consumer prices (pc) depend on wages, international prices, the exchange rate and the oil price 
measured in roubles in the long run. Notice that there is a smaller effect of the oil price and a larger 
effect of international prices compared to what is the case for the GDP deflator, reflecting a higher 
share of consumer goods in the CPI basket. This difference is illustrated in section 6 where the impact 
of changes to the oil price is greater on the GDP deflator than on consumer prices. Long-run 
homogeneity in wages, foreign prices and the oil price is rejected by data, as in the GDP deflator 
equation. The equation also contains a positive autoregressive term (Δpc). 
4.3.10. Government expenditure 
Equation 10: 
{ } 31(0.318) (0.054) (0.096)0.215 0.132 0.288 0.26 exp −−Δ = − − + Δt ttge ge poilrub g  
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Government expenditure (ge) is determined by the rouble oil price in the long run. The estimated 
coefficient of the equilibrium correction term of –0.13 implies a relatively slow adjustment of 
government revenues in the event of a shock in the oil price. The equation also contains positive 
autoregressive effects from ge. Government consumption and investment (G) is determined as 
Government expenditures less transfers (GT). 
4.3.11. Government revenue 
Equation 11:  
{ } 1(0.226) (0.052) (0.154)0.301 0.129 0.465 0.657−Δ = − − + Δt ttgr gr poilrub y  
 
Government revenue (gr) depends on the rouble oil price in the long run, with short-run effects of 
GDP. The estimated coefficient of the equilibrium correction term of –0.13 is similar to the 
corresponding coefficient in equation (10), and likewise implies relatively slow adjustment of 
government expenditure in the event of a shock in the oil price. A 1 per cent increase in the oil price 
yields an increase of almost 0.5 per cent in government revenues in the long run, indicating a firm 
success of the state capturing a large share of oil windfall profits. Furthermore, a raise in the oil price 
increases government revenues by more than it increases government expenditure, implying that rising 
oil prices yield a positive net effect on the fiscal budget. This is illustrated in section 6. 
4.3.12. Interest rate 
Equation 12: 
{ } 11(0.023) (0.112) (0.063)
2 3(0.025) (0.592) (0.592)
0.04 0.637 0.286 0.797 0.179
0.078 1.5 1.069
−
−
− −
Δ = − − Δ + − ΔΔ
− ΔΔ − Δ − Δ
t tt
t t t
R R pc U pc
pc U U  
 
Equation 127 may be interpreted as a reaction function for the nominal interest rate, suggesting that the 
CBR is leaning against the wind by responding to higher inflation (ΔPC) and a lower unemployment 
rate by tightening monetary policy. Thus, higher oil prices induce the CBR to adjust interest rates in 
order to dampen inflationary pressures. The estimated coefficient of the equilibrium correction term is 
                                                     
7 Bear in mind that all variables in this equation are defined as rates with no logarithmic transformation. Thus, the coefficient 
estimates of inflation and the nominal interest rate are interpreted as semi elasticities. A permanent one percentage point 
increase in the unemployment rate (inflation) leads to a 0.80 (0.29) percentage point reduction (increase) in the nominal 
interest rate in the long run. 
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0.64, implying rapid adjustment in the nominal interest rate to shocks in the unemployment rate and 
inflation. 
 
There are estimated short-run effects of inflation and the unemployment rate. The short-run effect of 
the unemployment rate is substantially greater than the long-run counterpart. Accordingly, the nominal 
interest rate responds quickly and with overshooting to shocks in the unemployment rate. The 
estimated short-run effect of inflation is negative and will cause the interest rate to move in opposite 
directions in the short and the long run. These short run effects contribute to improve the statistical 
properties of the equation, but also make the adjustment process of the interest rate less smooth in the 
model after a shock in the explanatory variables. 
4.3.13. Exchange rate 
Equation 13: 
 { } 21(0.161) (0.04) (0.03) (0.087) (0.038)1.251 0.311 0.186 0.065 0.269 0.123 −−Δ = − + − Δ − Δ − Δt t t ttrubusd rubusd poil poil R rubusd  
 In the long run, the rouble/USD exchange rate is a function of the oil price, where an increase in the 
oil price leads to a stronger rouble, in line with the Dutch disease hypothesis. We found no long term 
effects of domestic or international interest rates. 
 
The estimated equation also includes an impact effect of the oil price about the size of the long run 
effect, implying that the rouble/USD gets close to the new long run level instantly after a permanent 
change in the oil price. There is also an estimated positive short-run effect of the domestic interest 
rate. Again, international interest rates were rejected by data. An autoregressive term is also included 
in the equation.  
5. Fit 
Model evaluation is often based on forecasting properties and ability to reproduce history. When 
comparing predicted future values of endogenous variables with actual outcomes, prediction errors are 
not only caused by the model but also by the exogenous variables, which are made ex ante. 
Furthermore, one has to wait for future data to enable comparison of predicted and realized values of 
endogenous variables. These problems can be avoided by making forecasts for a historical period. 
Then the “correct” exogenous variables are available, and only the model is to blame for forecast 
errors, not erroneous assumptions about the future paths of exogenous variables. A stringent 
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evaluation is to test the model “out-of-sample”. In this case the model is tested for a historical period, 
but after the estimation period. If the test is performed “in-sample” the estimated coefficients reflect 
information from the forecast period. However, when testing the model out of sample another problem 
occurs: giving up the last observations in the data set for evaluation purposes implies a loss to 
estimation. A limited period of viable data is available for the Russian economy. All available 
information is therefore utilized in the estimation, and we are left with an in sample evaluation as the 
best alternative available in practice. When simulated data is compared to historical data within the 
estimation period, it is rather a description of how the model tracks/fits historical data than a test of 
forecasting properties. However, it is hard to imagine a model having good forecasting properties if it 
is not able to reproduce history in a realistic manner. 
 
To assess the model, we check its ability to track the actual development of the endogenous variables. 
Dynamic simulation starts in 1999Q1, after the 1998 crisis and within the estimation period of the 
exchange rate and interest rate equations. Dynamic simulation enables examination of model 
performance when used to forecast many periods into “the future”. Forecasts from previous periods – 
and not actual historical data – are used when assigning values to the lagged endogenous variables in 
the model. The results illustrate model performance as if we in 1999 had used the model to forecast 
the next 9 years, assuming we had known the correct paths for the exogenous variables. Stochastic 
Monte Carlo simulation is used to provide a measure of uncertainty in the results, by adding error 
bounds of plus/minus two standard deviations to the predictions. Appendix F displays actual and fitted 
values of the dependent variable including error bounds. The simulation exercise reveals good tracking 
abilities for all variables, which indicate good overall model stability. 
6. Changing the oil price 
The model can be simulated under various assumptions for the exogenous variables. In this section we 
apply two counterfactual paths for the oil price, solving the model in a high and a low oil price 
scenario over the nine-year sample 1999 Q1 to 2008 Q1. These exercises shed light on the importance 
of the oil price to the Russian economy, and in particular to what extent the oil price increase of the 
2000s has contributed to Russia’s economic growth in this period. The alternative oil price scenarios 
also serve as illustrations of model properties, e.g. the different channels through which the oil price 
influences the Russian economy. The model is simulated with endogenous monetary and fiscal 
policy.8 
                                                     
8 The model is simulated with historical residuals to ensure that the difference between the actual and the alternative scenario 
reflects only the effects of the change in the oil price, and not model errors. 
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Our analysis is partial in the sense that the USD oil price is the only exogenous variable that is 
changed. It is a common assumption that the oil price boom has been fuelled by fast-growing 
international demand, particularly in China. In our alternative scenarios international demand as well 
as international prices are treated exogenously and not changed from actual historical values. For 
instance, it would be perfectly reasonable to argue that a low oil price path would go hand in hand 
with low international demand and vice versa. However, with an alternative exogenous path for 
international demand we could not distinguish between the effects of the oil price and of international 
demand. The fact that monetary and fiscal policy, the exchange rate, and oil revenues and expenditure 
are endogenously determined in the model, based on historical behaviour, and thereby responds to 
changes in other model variables, contributes to realism in the results. 
 
At the outset of the simulation period the oil price stood at a record low USD 11/bbl. The oil price 
gained USD 13 through 1999 and another USD 6 in 2000. Through the course of 2001–2002 prices 
hovered around USD 25–30. What is referred to as the oil price boom in this paper started in 2003 Q2, 
when prices climbed uninterrupted from USD 26 to USD 51 after two years and on to USD 97 in 2008 
Q1. Beyond our sample the oil price grew another USD 25/bbl in 2008 Q2 before it fell to 55 in the 
second half of 2008, and recovered to 70-80 USD in the course of 2009. 
6.1. Mean reversion oil price scenario 
Going back to the outset of our simulation period, the oil price increases witnessed over the following 
decade were largely unexpected among analysts and policy makers. Pindyck (1999) argued in an 
influential article that oil prices exhibited reversion to a stochastically fluctuating trend that represents 
evolution of long-run marginal cost. According to his forecast the oil price in the period 2000–2010 
should revert to a long-run level of USD(1967) 4.5/bbl or USD(2000) 23/bbl. Similar price expectations 
prevailed in Russia into the 2000s, cf. Gurvich (2004). Our first counterfactual oil price scenario 
involves solving the model under the assumption that such expectations were fulfilled, keeping the oil 
price at USD(2000) 23/bbl throughout the simulation period. This hypothetical development is illustrated 
against the actual oil price in Figure 6.1. Hypothetical and actual oil prices are quite similar up to 2003 
Q2. For the sake of interpretability, we therefore allow the hypothetical and actual values to differ 
after this point only. 
 
Model simulation along this oil price scenario sheds light on the question: How would the Russian 
economy have performed had it not been for the sustained oil price boom witnessed up until July 
2008? Among Russia-focused researchers this is a question of much debate. Particularly because the 
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debate is often coupled with an evaluation of President and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s “semi-
authoritarian” economic model as is the case in McFaul and Stoner-Weiss (2008).  
 
Figure 6.1: Oil price, actual and mean reversion scenario 
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Figure 6.2 compares real GDP under the mean reversion scenario with the observed development of 
the same variable. Simulated GDP starts developing along a lower path immediately as hypothetical 
and actual oil prices diverge. The gap between actual and simulated GDP grows throughout the 
simulation period as oil price divergence increases. At the end of the simulation period, GDP is 6–7 
per cent lower in the mean reversion oil price scenario. 
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Figure 6.2: GDP, actual and mean reversion scenario 
-16
-12
-8
-4
0
4
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
3,200
3,600
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Real GDP (Mean Reversion)
Real GDP bln. RUB - Right Axis
Percent Deviation - Left Axis
 
 
Lower oil prices have a direct, negative effect on oil exports, government revenue and expenditure as 
well as consumer and producer prices, and cause the rouble to depreciate. Disposable income drops 
and curbs consumption. Investments are affected negatively through lower domestic demand. 
 
Inflation drops as a direct response to the lower oil price. This is reinforced through the wage channel 
as lower GDP increases unemployment and accordingly yields a negative effect on wage growth. A 
weaker rouble contributes ceteris paribus to higher inflation through pricier imports. At the end of the 
simulation period the simulated rouble is some 15 per cent weaker than actual observations. 
 
The interest rate is lowered by approximately 2 percentage points as a response to increasing 
unemployment and lower inflation. Lower interest rates yield a rouble depreciation. Negative effects 
on GDP of lower oil prices are countered somewhat through the stabilizing properties of imports and 
non-oil exports. Imports are subdued through lower domestic demand, while non-oil exports 
experience a positive effect through depreciation of the rouble and lower domestic inflation. 
 
Oil exports decrease from a peak in 2004, to end up 20 per cent lower than actual values. This may 
indicate that Russia’s maintained level of oil production would not be viable if not for the substantial 
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increase in the oil price actually observed. Our simulation thereby lends indicative support to the claim 
that Russian oil production has reached a peak and can be expected to decline in the future unless 
prices grow significantly.  
 
Figure 6.3 contains the simulated and actual evolution of the GDP deflator, rouble–dollar exchange 
rate, non-oil and oil exports as well as money market rate and real wage. Appendix B contains graphic 
illustrations of all endogenous solutions in the mean reversion scenario. 
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Figure 6.3: Mean reversion, selected variables 
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6.2. Early boom scenario 
A different question is how the Russian economy would have performed should the oil price boom 
have occurred at the outset of our simulation period in 1999 rather than in 2003. Accordingly, we 
simulate the model applying a hypothetical oil price path, where the oil price observations for 2003 Q2 
and onwards are shifted back to 1999 Q1. Thus the oil price boom starts 18 periods earlier and 
culminates in 2004 Q2 with the value observed in 2008 Q1. For the rest of the simulation period, we 
keep a constant difference between the hypothetical and the observed oil price, see Figure 6.4. 
 
Figure 6.4: Oil Price, actual and early boom scenario 
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In the early boom scenario, GDP grows faster than actual observations until mid-sample when the gap 
between simulated and actual GDP starts to close, from 24 per cent to 12 per cent above actual 
observations at sample end, see Figure 6.5. 
 
At first, a higher oil price path leads to higher oil exports and -income, increasing public consumption 
and investment as well as household consumption. Higher demand leads to increased private 
investment and higher imports. Lower unemployment generates higher wage growth, contributing to 
higher inflation, although inflation is dampened somewhat by lower imported price impulses due to a 
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stronger rouble. Non-oil exports are curbed by the rouble and higher domestic inflation, and are 12 per 
cent lower after 5 years. 
 
The oil price gap increases until mid-sample only, remaining constant thereafter. Thus the scenario oil 
price is growing in parallel with the actual oil price from 2004 Q2, providing no additional stimulus to 
the economy from this point. From here on, the development is reversed somewhat for all variables. 
 
Growth in government expenditure drops and lower growth in real disposable income brings down 
growth in household consumption. Private investments are hampered by weaker overall economic 
development. Lower inflation and higher unemployment cause lower interest rates, resulting in a 
weaker rouble which reduces petroleum income measured in roubles, curbing domestic demand 
further. Nevertheless, at the end of the simulation period the rouble is still 14 per cent stronger than the 
observed counterpart. Non-oil exports gains somewhat on the observed value over the last 4 years 
thanks to the weaker rouble, but is still 10 per cent below at the end of the simulation period.  
 
Figure 6.6 illustrates the evolution of selected variables under the early boom scenario. For reference, 
the solutions for all endogenous variables are provided in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 6.5: GDP, actual and early boom scenario 
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Figure 6.6: Early boom scenario, selected variables 
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7. Conclusion 
Russia is occasionally surpassing Saudi Arabia as the world’s number one oil producer and exporter. 
Oil revenues make a significant share of Russia’s exports and foreign trade turnover as well as 
government earnings. The demise of the Soviet Union and Russia’s recovery in the 2000’s have been 
linked to falling and rising oil prices respectively. Prior to the 2008 economic crisis Russia’s average 
GDP growth since 2001 has been in excess of 7 per cent and thus among the strongest in the world. At 
the same time Russia has seen an increased role of the state while market institutions remain 
underdeveloped. This has lead critics of the Russian regime, and in part the current President 
Medvedev to claim that Russia’s boom has largely been facilitated by unprecedented oil price growth. 
 
To shed light on these issues we have estimated a macro econometric model of the Russian economy. 
The Russian society as well as the economy, including fiscal and monetary policy, has been in 
constant development throughout the data period. This makes identifying stable relationships a 
challenging task. One important example is the change in exchange rate regime following the 1998 
default, allowing us to model the exchange rate and interest rate from 1999 only. Another example is 
the household consumption equation, where a change in consumer behaviour is identified at the 
beginning of the millennium, controlled for by introducing a step dummy variable. Nevertheless, we 
estimate a model with good statistical properties that explains history well. 
 
We assess the degree of oil price dependency of the Russian economy through two counterfactual 
shifts in the historical oil price. We analyse how the economy, according to the model, responds to 
these alternative paths. Under the first scenario the real oil price does not increase after 2003, in 
contrast to the soaring oil prices actually observed. Under the second scenario the 2003 oil price boom 
commences in 1999 rather than in 2003. The simulations indicate that the oil price has been of 
considerable importance to the Russian economy over the last decade. However, the results indicate 
that the Russian economy exhibits significant growth capabilities also in the absence of growth in the 
oil price. Furthermore, an increase in the oil price yields a real appreciation of the rouble, leading to 
reduced non-oil exports in line with the Dutch Disease hypothesis.  
 
The alternative scenarios were chosen to provide grounds for a discussion of how the Russian 
economy actually would have performed should oil prices have evolved in a different way. The 
scenarios are chosen with an eye to realism in the sense that they should be easy to relate to the actual 
development of the oil price. The two alternative paths for the oil price are not symmetric, which 
complicates scenario comparison. Nevertheless, we argue that our choice is justified as we shed light 
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on issues that are of direct concern to many Russia analysts. For the interested reader Appendix B 
contains model solutions for a 100 per cent permanent increase in the oil price as well as a permanent 
halving of the oil price. These more stylized simulations forego some realism in order to make the 
results more easily interpretable.  
 
Notwithstanding the advances in this paper, several issues are left in need of further research. The 
CBR has operated a money targeting program aimed at providing the economy with sufficient 
liquidity subject to constraining inflation and concerns for rapid rouble appreciation. Our knowledge 
of how money supply affects interest rates and accompanying transmission effects into inflation is 
limited.9 Nevertheless, we find empirical evidence for modelling monetary policy as the CBR “leaning 
against the wind”, tightening monetary policy – represented by the money market interest rate – in the 
face of increasing inflation and falling unemployment. Keeping in mind these uncertainties and the 
omission of one of the target variables of the Russian monetary policy (money supply), more detailed 
modelling of Russian monetary policy might provide important insights and add precision to model 
forecasts. 
 
An additional interesting implication of the model is that the non-oil export industries are left alone 
taking a double beating from higher oil prices, as the channel from interest rates to the economy goes 
through the exchange rate. Higher inflation is met by higher interest rates, leading to a stronger rouble. 
Thus, when the oil price increases, the non-oil export industries are not only hit by high domestic 
inflation, but also by a strong rouble. 
 
With reference to the discussion above, a prime goal for Russian monetary authorities is a western 
style transfer to free float of the rouble and inflation targeting using the interest rate. When it comes to 
fiscal policy, our model does not include a specific spending rule for petroleum revenues. Rather, 
government expenditure is modelled based on observed behaviour over the estimation sample. Model 
simulation illustrates how government spending increases slower than government revenues following 
a positive shift in the oil price, allowing significant amounts to be transferred to the Reserve and 
National Wealth Funds. 
                                                     
9 We found no empirical evidence for a link between money supply and interest rates nor inflation in the Russian economy. 
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Appendix A 
Variable list (data sources in parentheses) 
C = Household consumption (IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS)) 
I = Private investments (IFS) 
G = Government consumption and investment (IFS) 
GT = Government transfers (see definition) 
XOIL = Oil exports (IFS) 
XEXOIL = Non oil exports (IFS) 
Z = Imports (IFS) 
Y = GDP (IFS) 
YD = Disposable income (see definition) 
GE = Government expenditure (Ministry of Finance, Economic Expert Group) 
GR = Government revenue (Ministry of Finance, Economic Expert Group) 
PC = Consumer price index (OECD MEI) 
PY = GDP deflator (OECD MEI) 
DPC = Consumer price inflation (see definition) 
DPY = GDP deflator inflation (see definition) 
R = 3 month money market interest rate (IFS) 
RPC = real interest rate (see definition) 
RPY = real interest rate (see definition) 
REX = real exchange rate (see definition) 
W = Wage per employed (IFS) 
U = Unemployment rate (Ecowin) 
E = Number of employed (Ecowin) 
L = Labour force (Ecowin) 
PROD = Productivity (see definition) 
POIL = Oil price (Brent Blend) denoted in USD (Norges Bank) 
POILRUB = Oil price (Brent blend) in roubles (see definition) 
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Estimated equations (identical to equations 1-13 in section 4)) 
 
{ } 1(0.027) (0.057) (0.05) 0,0060.121 0.214 0.346 0.028 01 1−Δ = − − − + Δ −t ttc c yd yd DSTEP Q  
{ } 1(0.148) (0.074)1.204 0.378 −Δ = − − −t ti i y  
{ } 11(0.428) (0.081) (0.111)1.828 0.355 0.245 0.375 −−Δ = − − − + + Δt ttxexoil xexoil wimp rex xexoil  
{ } 31(0.194) (0.033) (0.156)0.561 0.098 0.612( ) 0.323 −−Δ = − − − Δ − Δt ttxoil xoil poilrub py py  
{ } 1(0.166) 0.0720.384 0.292 0.267( ) −Δ = − − − + + +t tz z c i g xexoil  
{ } 1(0.039) (0.05)0.199 0.243 0.115 0.037( ) −Δ = − + − −t tU U y w py  
{ } 11(0.155) (0.042) (0.053)0.679 0.267 4.26 0.79 0.28 −−Δ = − − + − + Δt ttw w pc U prod pc  
{ } 1(0.118) (0.042)
1(0.02) (0.06)
1.121 0.416 0.488 0.149( )
0.102 0.384
−
−
Δ = − − − − +
+ Δ + Δ
t t
t t
py py w pceu poilrub
poilrub py  
{ } 11(0.195) (0.055) (0.036)1.112 0.313 0.387( ) 0.086 0.505 −−Δ = − − − + − + Δt ttpc pc w pceu poilrub pc  
{ } 31(0.318) (0.054) (0.096)0.215 0.132 0.288 0.26 exp −−Δ = − − + Δt ttge ge poilrub g  
{ } 1(0.226) (0.052) (0.154)0.301 0.129 0.465 0.657−Δ = − − + Δt ttgr gr poilrub y  
{ } 11(0.023) (0.112) (0.063)
2 3(0.025) (0.592) (0.592)
0.04 0.637 0.286 0.797 0.179
0.078 1.5 1.069
−
−
− −
Δ = − − Δ + − ΔΔ
− ΔΔ − Δ − Δ
t tt
t t t
R R pc U pc
pc U U  
{ } 21(0.161) (0.04) (0.03) (0.087) (0.038)1.251 0.311 0.186 0.065 0.269 0.123 −−Δ = − + − Δ − Δ − Δt t t ttrubusd rubusd poil poil R rubusd  
Definitions 
log( / )=t t tc CONS PC
 
log( / )=t t tyd YD PC
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log( / )=t t ty Y PY
 
log( / )=t t ti I PY
 
log( / )=t t txexoil XEXOIL PY
 
log( /( * ))=t t t trex PY PYUSA RUBUSD
 
log( /( * ))=t t t txoil XOIL POIL RUBUSD
 
log( / )=t t tz Z PY
 
log( / )=t t tg G PY
 
log( * )=t t tpceu PCEU RUBEUR  
log( / )=t t tge GE PY  
log( / )=t t tgr GR PY  
log( * )=t t tpolirub POIL RUBUSD  
Identities 
(14) E = L * (1 - (U)) 
 
(15) PROD = (Y / PY) / E  
 
(16) DPY = (PY / PY(-1))^4 - 1 
 
(17) DPC = (pPC / PC(-1))^4 - 1 
 
(18) RPY = R - DPY 
 
(19) RPC = R - DPC 
 
(20) YD = Y - GR + GT  
 
(21) G = GE - GT 
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 (22) Y = G + CONS + I + XEXOIL + XOIL - Z + SD 
 
In equation (14), employment (E) follows from labour supply (L) and the unemployment rate (U). 
Productivity is defined in (15) as real GDP per employed. Equation (16) and (17) defines inflation in 
the GDP deflator and CPI, respectively, as growth in prices from the previous quarter at annualised 
rates. Corresponding real interest rates are defined in (18) and (19). Private sector disposable income 
(YD) is defined in (20) by what is left to the private sector after the public sector has taken its share 
(GR) less transfers to the private sector (GT). Public consumption (G) equals government expenditure 
(GE) less transfers to the private sector, as seen in equation (21). GDP (Y) follows in (22) as the sum 
of public consumption and investments (G), household consumption (CONS), private sector 
investments (I), exports excluding oil (XEXOIL), oil exports (XOIL) less imports (Z) and adding a 
term covering statistical discrepancies (SD). 
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Appendix B  
Figure 7 Mean reversion scenario 
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Figure 8 Early boom scenario 
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Figure 9 100 % sustained oil price increase 
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Figure 10 50% sustained oil price decrease 
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Appendix C 
Residual misspecification tests 
The null hypothesis of normal distribution of the residuals is not rejected for any of the equations at 
the five per cent level. The Jarque-Bera statistic for each equation is reported in the table below. 
If the error term is serially correlated, the estimated OLS standard errors are invalid and the estimated 
coefficients will be biased and inconsistent due to the presence of a lagged dependent variable on the 
right-hand side. The Breusch-Godfrey LM-test does not reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation up to order four for any of the equations at the five per cent level. 
The ARCH test for heteroskedasticity in the residual regress the squared residuals on lagged squared 
residuals and a constant. In the presence of heteroskedasticity, ordinary least squares estimates are still 
consistent, but the conventional computed standard errors are no longer valid. Heteroscedasticity does 
not appear to pose a problem in any of the equations. 
 
 Normality Jarque Bera 
Serial Correlation 
 Breusch-Godfrey 
Heteroskedasticity 
ARCH 
  Prob.  Prob.  Prob. 
Equation Jarque-Bera  
Obs*R-
squared 
Chi-
Square(2) 
Obs*R-
squared 
Chi-
Square(1) 
CONS 1.483 0.476 5.771 0.056 0.582 0.446 
I 1.423 0.491 3.129 0.209 0.147 0.701 
XEXOIL 7.095 0.029 1.350 0.509 3.738 0.053 
XOIL 0.122 0.941 7.065 0.029 0.803 0.370 
Z 0.362 0.835 4.425 0.109 0.0003 0.985 
U 3.375 0.184 2.358 0.308 0.593 0.441 
W 0.106 0.948 4.027 0.134 0.867 0.352 
PY 2.069 0.355 0.787 0.675 0.150 0.699 
PC 2.000 0.368 3.320 0.190 0.245 0.621 
GE 0.637 0.727 1.459 0.482 0.398 0.528 
GR 0.786 0.674 1.548 0.461 3.271 0.071 
R 1.613 0.446 1.978 0.372 0.062 0.803 
RUBUSD 0.302 0.859 4.815 0.090 1.838 0.175 
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Appendix D 
Stability tests, recursive residuals10 
In this appendix we display plots of recursive residuals for each equation. Plus/minus two standard 
errors are shown at each point. Residuals outside the standard error bands would suggest instability in 
the equation parameters. At the 5 per cent level, 5 observations out of 100 outside the error band are 
acceptable. This test does not give strong indications of instability for any of the equations. 
 
Figure 11  (1) C 
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10 EViews only allows for recursive estimation after the last dummy varible, reducing the  estimation period for recursive 
residuals for  some equations  
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Figure 12  (2) I 
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Figure 13 (3) XEXOIL 
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Figure 14 (4) XOIL 
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Figure 15 (5) Z 
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Figure 16 (6) U 
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Figure 17 (7) W 
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Figure 18 (8) PY 
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Figure 19 (9) PC 
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Figure 20 (10) GE  
(Not available due to late dummy variable (08Q1) 
 
Figure 21 (11) GR 
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Figure 22 (12) R 
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Figure 23 (13) RUBUSD 
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Appendix E 
Detailed estimation results 
The R-squared (R2) statistic measures the success of the regression in predicting the values of the 
dependent variable within the sample. The statistic will equal one if the regression fits perfectly, and 
zero if it fits no better than the simple mean of the dependent variable. The adjusted R2 penalizes the 
R2 for the addition of regressors which do not contribute to the explanatory power of the model. 
 
The standard error (S.E.) of the regression is a summary measure based on the estimated variance of 
the residuals. 
 
The Durbin-Watson (DW) is a test for first order serial correlation in the residuals. As a rule of thumb, 
if the DW is less than 2, there is evidence of positive serial correlation. If there are lagged dependent 
variables on the right-hand side of the regression, the DW test is no longer valid. Additional testing of 
serial correlation is reported in appendix D. 
 
The Akaike-, Schwarz- and Hannan-Quinn information criteria provide measures of information that 
strikes a balance goodness of fit and parsimonious specification of the model, and are used as a guide 
in model selection. 
 
The F-statistic reported in the regression output is from a test of the hypothesis that all of the slope 
coefficients (excluding the constant, or intercept) in a regression are zero. 
 
The Prob (F-statistic) shows the probability of drawing a t-statistic (or a z-statistic) as extreme as the 
one actually observed, under the assumption that the errors are normally distributed, or that the 
estimated coefficients are asymptotically normally distributed. 
The table also shows the mean and the standard deviation of the endogenous (dependent variables. 
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(1) Consumption: 
========================= 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(CONS/PC))  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.120871 0.025899 -4.666944 0.0000 
LOG(CONS(-1)/PC(-1))-LOG(YD(-1)/PC(-1)) -0.214604 0.057018 -3.763763 0.0005 
S2 0.046111 0.016405 2.810829 0.0073 
S3 0.043474 0.019195 2.264915 0.0284 
S4 0.074759 0.014685 5.091035 0.0000 
DSTEP01Q1 -0.028192 0.006278 -4.490578 0.0000 
D97Q1 0.085422 0.022954 3.721491 0.0005 
D(LOG(YD/PC)) 0.346299 0.050087 6.913959 0.0000 
R-squared 0.922493    Mean dependent var 0.009489 
Adjusted R-squared 0.910437    S.D. dependent var 0.072662 
S.E. of regression 0.021746    Akaike info criterion -4.680548 
Sum squared resid 0.021279    Schwarz criterion -4.383146 
Log likelihood 132.0345    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.566181 
F-statistic 76.51346    Durbin-Watson stat 2.417535 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
 
 (2) Investment: 
========================= 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(I/PY))  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -1.204714 0.148918 -8.089785 0.0000 
LOG(I(-1)/PY(-1))-LOG(Y(-1)/PY(-1)) -0.378270 0.100879 -3.749723 0.0005 
S2 0.724264 0.064083 11.30200 0.0000 
S3 0.713019 0.046111 15.46318 0.0000 
S4 0.825476 0.040730 20.26723 0.0000 
D98Q4 -0.324942 0.081942 -3.965512 0.0003 
R-squared 0.965666    Mean dependent var 0.016583 
Adjusted R-squared 0.961934    S.D. dependent var 0.402684 
S.E. of regression 0.078565    Akaike info criterion -2.141604 
Sum squared resid 0.283936    Schwarz criterion -1.916460 
Log likelihood 61.68170    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.055289 
F-statistic 258.7577    Durbin-Watson stat 2.321732 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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(3) Non-oil exports: 
========================= 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(XEXOIL/PY))  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 1.828396 0.428233 4.269630 0.0001 
LOG(XEXOIL(-1)/PY(-1))-LOG(WIMP(-1)) -0.355108 0.081150 -4.375952 0.0001 
LOG(PY(-1))-LOG(PYUSA(-1)*RUBUSD(-1)) -0.087683 0.045792 -1.914800 0.0619 
S2 0.212675 0.040840 5.207508 0.0000 
S3 0.111594 0.030113 3.705792 0.0006 
S4 0.215660 0.030916 6.975732 0.0000 
D98Q1 -0.239598 0.076137 -3.146906 0.0029 
D(LOG(XEXOIL(-1)/PY(-1))) 0.375989 0.110604 3.399412 0.0014 
R-squared 0.732149    Mean dependent var 0.002792 
Adjusted R-squared 0.690484    S.D. dependent var 0.130267 
S.E. of regression 0.072473    Akaike info criterion -2.272951 
Sum squared resid 0.236354    Schwarz criterion -1.975549 
Log likelihood 68.23321    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.158584 
F-statistic 17.57200    Durbin-Watson stat 1.845679 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
 
 (4) Oil Exports: 
========================= 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(XOIL/POILRUB))  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.561516 0.193880 2.896196 0.0062
LOG((XOIL(-1)/POILRUB(-1))) -0.098376 0.033011 -2.980097 0.0050
LOG((POILRUB(-1)/PY(-1))) 0.059965 0.023583 2.542734 0.0152
D98Q4 -0.153863 0.048519 -3.171163 0.0030
D00Q4 -0.113925 0.048184 -2.364374 0.0233
D05Q1 -0.104472 0.046224 -2.260126 0.0296
D03Q3 0.145130 0.046906 3.094068 0.0037
S2 0.093972 0.016430 5.719507 0.0000
S3 0.079233 0.016754 4.729076 0.0000
D(LOG(PY(-3))) -0.323048 0.156158 -2.068727 0.0454
R-squared 0.745209    Mean dependent var 0.015381
Adjusted R-squared 0.684864    S.D. dependent var 0.079638
S.E. of regression 0.044707    Akaike info criterion -3.194337
Sum squared resid 0.075950    Schwarz criterion -2.804504
Log likelihood 86.66410    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.047019
F-statistic 12.34910    Durbin-Watson stat 2.367842
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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(5) Imports: 
========================= 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(Z/PY))  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.384194 0.165874 -2.316180 0.0253 
LOG(Z(-1)/PY(-1)) -0.292049 0.072803 -4.011495 0.0002 
LOG(CONS(-1)/PC(-1))+LOG(I(-1)/PY(-
1))+LOG(G(-1)/PY(-1))+LOG(XEXOIL(-
1)/PY(-1)) 0.078760 0.016876 4.667018 0.0000 
S2 0.324207 0.017044 19.02138 0.0000 
S3 0.291994 0.016596 17.59469 0.0000 
S4 0.269016 0.015949 16.86766 0.0000 
D95Q3 -0.199719 0.040101 -4.980410 0.0000 
D99Q1 0.212880 0.040251 5.288848 0.0000 
D00Q1 0.205820 0.040503 5.081556 0.0000 
R-squared 0.921690    Mean dependent var 0.001451 
Adjusted R-squared 0.907452    S.D. dependent var 0.124809 
S.E. of regression 0.037969    Akaike info criterion -3.550576 
Sum squared resid 0.063432    Schwarz criterion -3.215998 
Log likelihood 103.0903    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.421914 
F-statistic 64.73387    Durbin-Watson stat 2.112284 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
 
(6) Unemployment: 
Dependent Variable: D(U)   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.198772 0.038910 5.108514 0.0000
U(-1) -0.243674 0.050797 -4.797051 0.0000
LOG(Y(-1)/PY(-1)) -0.028316 0.007164 -3.952348 0.0003
S2 -0.012241 0.001552 -7.884774 0.0000
S3 -0.008213 0.001481 -5.544345 0.0000
LOG(W(-1)/PY(-1)) 0.008918 0.005809 1.535208 0.1317
D99Q1 0.012710 0.004264 2.980743 0.0046
D02Q1 -0.010002 0.004207 -2.377218 0.0218
R-squared 0.682786    Mean dependent var -0.000145
Adjusted R-squared 0.633442    S.D. dependent var 0.006600
S.E. of regression 0.003996    Akaike info criterion -8.068888
Sum squared resid 0.000718    Schwarz criterion -7.771485
Log likelihood 221.8255    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.954521
F-statistic 13.83718    Durbin-Watson stat 1.743767
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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(7) Wages: 
========================= 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(W))   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.678678 0.154673 4.387832 0.0001
LOG(W(-1))-LOG(PC(-1)) -0.267254 0.042086 -6.350246 0.0000
U(-1) -1.136862 0.310776 -3.658145 0.0007
LOG(PROD(-1)) 0.211739 0.040898 5.177198 0.0000
S2 0.086405 0.008895 9.713780 0.0000
S4 0.077974 0.008839 8.821658 0.0000
S3 0.076445 0.008888 8.600623 0.0000
D04Q1 -0.080752 0.022445 -3.597741 0.0008
D(LOG(PC(-1))) 0.280352 0.053182 5.271572 0.0000
R-squared 0.913491    Mean dependent var 0.073885
Adjusted R-squared 0.897762    S.D. dependent var 0.065873
S.E. of regression 0.021063    Akaike info criterion -4.729114
Sum squared resid 0.019520    Schwarz criterion -4.394536
Log likelihood 134.3215    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.600451
F-statistic 58.07698    Durbin-Watson stat 2.490735
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
 
(8) GDP Deflator: 
======
======
======
= 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(PY))  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -1.121735 0.117741 -9.527172 0.0000 
LOG(PY(-1)) -0.415577 0.042377 -9.806562 0.0000 
LOG(W(-1)) 0.202693 0.021926 9.244413 0.0000 
LOG(PCEU(-1)*RUBEUR(-
1))+LOG(POILRUB(-1)) 0.061878 0.008830 7.007376 0.0000 
D(LOG(POILRUB)) 0.101800 0.020539 4.956377 0.0000 
D(LOG(PY(-1))) 0.383897 0.055803 6.879550 0.0000 
D98Q4 0.164627 0.023458 7.017857 0.0000 
R-squared 0.946159    Mean dependent var 0.064091 
Adjusted R-squared 0.939137    S.D. dependent var 0.076752 
S.E. of regression 0.018935    Akaike info criterion -4.973099 
Sum squared resid 0.016493    Schwarz criterion -4.712872 
Log likelihood 138.7871    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.873028 
F-statistic 134.7290    Durbin-Watson stat 2.014737 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
55 
(9) CPI: 
========================= 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(PC))  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -1.111547 0.194940 -5.701990 0.0000 
LOG(PC(-1)) -0.313133 0.054622 -5.732768 0.0000 
LOG(W(-1))+LOG(PCEU(-1)*RUBEUR(-1)) 0.120833 0.022999 5.253882 0.0000 
LOG(POIL(-1)*RUBUSD(-1)) 0.026761 0.009497 2.817987 0.0073 
D95Q1 0.065247 0.028220 2.312079 0.0256 
D95Q2 -0.067428 0.021886 -3.080953 0.0036 
D95Q3 -0.047170 0.018267 -2.582284 0.0133 
D98Q4 0.268382 0.013968 19.21437 0.0000 
D98Q3 0.144525 0.013967 10.34745 0.0000 
D(LOG(PC(-1))) 0.505479 0.035639 14.18329 0.0000 
R-squared 0.979181    Mean dependent var 0.061510 
Adjusted R-squared 0.974823    S.D. dependent var 0.078329 
S.E. of regression 0.012429    Akaike info criterion -5.769353 
Sum squared resid 0.006642    Schwarz criterion -5.397600 
Log likelihood 162.8879    Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.626395 
F-statistic 224.7090    Durbin-Watson stat 1.662099 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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(10)Government Expenditure: 
========================= 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(GE/PY))  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.214844 0.317956 0.675705 0.5030
LOG(GE(-1)/PY(-1)) -0.131642 0.053691 -2.451830 0.0186
S2 0.433663 0.039040 11.10828 0.0000
S3 0.270033 0.035624 7.580015 0.0000
S4 0.541357 0.051523 10.50707 0.0000
LOG(POIL(-1)*RUBUSD(-1)) 0.037635 0.011499 3.272969 0.0022
D05Q3 0.259043 0.088624 2.922930 0.0056
D05Q4 -0.243054 0.092321 -2.632694 0.0119
D96Q1 0.491896 0.091955 5.349316 0.0000
D07Q4 0.515132 0.094485 5.452008 0.0000
D08Q1 -0.347472 0.097995 -3.545827 0.0010
D(LOG(GE(-3)/PY(-3))) 0.260095 0.096245 2.702428 0.0100
R-squared 0.907185    Mean dependent var -0.004731
Adjusted R-squared 0.882283    S.D. dependent var 0.244449
S.E. of regression 0.083870    Akaike info criterion -1.922981
Sum squared resid 0.288403    Schwarz criterion -1.476877
Log likelihood 62.95900    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.751431
F-statistic 36.43064    Durbin-Watson stat 2.247138
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
 
(11) Government Revenue: 
========================= 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(GR/PY))  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.301172 0.226087 1.332108 0.1895
LOG(GR(-1)/PY(-1)) -0.129020 0.051704 -2.495352 0.0163
LOG(POIL(-1)*RUBUSD(-1)) 0.059846 0.019867 3.012332 0.0042
S2 0.159549 0.036424 4.380319 0.0001
S4 0.166698 0.034823 4.787028 0.0000
D(LOG(Y/PY)) 0.656659 0.153510 4.277641 0.0001
D96Q1 0.546122 0.107700 5.070779 0.0000
D05Q1 0.310960 0.106129 2.930029 0.0053
R-squared 0.698075    Mean dependent var 0.012244
Adjusted R-squared 0.651109    S.D. dependent var 0.170825
S.E. of regression 0.100901    Akaike info criterion -1.611097
Sum squared resid 0.458145    Schwarz criterion -1.313695
Log likelihood 50.69407    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.496730
F-statistic 14.86337    Durbin-Watson stat 2.187674
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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(12) Money market rate: 
========================= 
Dependent Variable: D(R)   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.040272 0.022668 1.776621 0.0873
R(-1) -0.637271 0.111815 -5.699358 0.0000
DPC(-1) 0.182308 0.062240 2.929127 0.0070
U(-1) -0.507527 0.346651 -1.464089 0.1552
D99Q2 -0.323859 0.141256 -2.292704 0.0302
D99Q3 -0.239645 0.075238 -3.185165 0.0037
D01Q4 0.081950 0.019018 4.308998 0.0002
D(DPC(-1)) -0.179025 0.062266 -2.875156 0.0080
D(DPC(-2)) -0.077936 0.025368 -3.072157 0.0049
D(U) -1.502241 0.592493 -2.535457 0.0176
D(U(-3)) -1.069032 0.592035 -1.805689 0.0826
R-squared 0.923789    Mean dependent var -0.012432
Adjusted R-squared 0.894477    S.D. dependent var 0.055268
S.E. of regression 0.017954    Akaike info criterion -4.960284
Sum squared resid 0.008381    Schwarz criterion -4.481362
Log likelihood 102.7653    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.791442
F-statistic 31.51570    Durbin-Watson stat 2.391560
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
 
(13) RUBUSD: 
========================= 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(RUBUSD))  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.251254 0.161952 7.726055 0.0000
LOG(RUBUSD(-1)) -0.311048 0.044275 -7.025404 0.0000
LOG(POIL(-1)) -0.057695 0.008822 -6.539799 0.0000
D(LOG(POIL)) -0.065333 0.030495 -2.142393 0.0401
D(R) -0.268828 0.087294 -3.079569 0.0043
D(LOG(RUBUSD(-2))) -0.122892 0.036785 -3.340781 0.0022
R-squared 0.860749    Mean dependent var 0.008278
Adjusted R-squared 0.838290    S.D. dependent var 0.050834
S.E. of regression 0.020442    Akaike info criterion -4.795065
Sum squared resid 0.012954    Schwarz criterion -4.533835
Log likelihood 94.70871    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.702969
F-statistic 38.32406    Durbin-Watson stat 1.455416
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Appendix F 
In-sample dynamic simulation 
Actual and fitted values of the dependent variable including error bounds (+/-2*std.e.). 
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